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Abstract
This paper presents and analyzes a novel concatenated coding scheme for enabling error resilience in two
distributed storage settings: one being storage using existing regenerating codes and the second being storage using
locally repairable codes. The concatenated coding scheme brings together a maximum rank distance (MRD) code as
an outer code and either a globally regenerating or a locally repairable code as an inner code. Also, error resilience
for combination of locally repairable codes with regenerating codes is considered. This concatenated coding system
is designed to handle two different types of adversarial errors: the first type includes an adversary that can replace the
content of an affected node only once; while the second type studies an adversary that is capable of polluting data an
unbounded number of times. The paper establishes an upper bound on the resilience capacity for a locally repairable
code and proves that this concatenated coding coding scheme attains the upper bound on resilience capacity for
the first type of adversary. Further, the paper presents mechanisms that combine the presented concatenated coding
scheme with subspace signatures to achieve error resilience for the second type of errors.
I. INTRODUCTION
Distrubuted storage systems (DSS) have gained importance over recent years as dependable, easily accessible
and well administrated cloud resource for both individuals and businesses. There are multiple research issues that
are unique to DSS; some of which are logistical and market driven, while others relate with their underlying design.
A primary concern in designing DSS is to ensure resilience to failures, as it is desirable that a user (data collector)
can retrieve the stored data even in the presence of node failures. As studied in the pioneering work by Dimakis
et al. [1], coding introduces redundancy to a storage system in the most efficient manner to enable resilience to
failures. In [1], Dimakis et al. go one step further: when a single node fails, they propose reconstructing the data
stored on the failed node in order to maintain the required level of redundancy in the system. This process of data
reconstruction for a failed node is called the node repair process [1]. During a node repair process, the node which
is added to the system to replace the failed node, downloads data from a set of surviving nodes to reconstruct the
lost (or its equivalent) data.
Regenerating codes and locally repairable codes (LRCs) are two families of codes that are especially designed to
allow for efficient node repairs in DSS. In particular, regenerating codes are designed to reduce repair bandwidth,
i.e., the amount of data downloaded from surviving nodes during the node repair process. On the other hand, LRCs
are designed to have a small number of nodes participating in the node repair process. The constructions for these
two families of codes can be found in [1]–[22] and references therein.
Although failure resilience is of critical importance as failure of storage nodes is commonplace in storage systems,
there are multiple other design considerations that merit study in conjunction with failure resilience. These include
security, error resilience, update efficiency and load balancing. In this paper, we address the issue of instilling error
resilience in DSS, particularly against adversarial errors. In particular, we model and present coding methodologies
that allow for a data collector to correctly decode data even in presence of adversarial errors.
In [1], Dimakis et al. establish close connections between DSS with node repairs and the network coding problem.
Thus, it is natural to apply the techniques used for error correction in network coding for DSS with node repairs.
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2Rank-metric codes are known to be a powerful solution to error correction problem in network coding [23]–[27].
The primary idea of this paper is to apply a similar technique, based on rank-metric codes, for error resilience in
DSS.
In this paper, we propose a novel concatenated coding scheme, based on rank-metric codes, which provides
resilience against adversarial errors in both regenerating codes and LRCs based DSS. Moreover, we also consider
error resilience in DSS employing combination of LRCs and regenerating codes [18], [20].
The problem of reliability of DSS against adversarial errors was considered in [28]–[31]. In particular, in [30],
Pawar et al. derive upper bounds on the amount of data that can be stored on the system and reliably made available
to a data collector when bandwidth optimal node repair is performed, and present coding strategies that achieve
the upper bound for a particular range of system parameters, namely in the bandwidth-limited regime. A related
but different problem of securing stored data against passive eavesdroppers is addressed in [18], [30], [32], [33].
In this paper, we study the notion of an omniscient adversary who can observe all nodes and has full knowledge
of the coding scheme employed by the system [30]. As in [30], we assume an upper bound on the number of nodes
that can be controlled by such an omniscient adversary. We classify adversarial attacks by such an adversary into
two classes:
1) Static errors: an omniscient adversary replaces the content of an affected node with nonsensical (unrelated)
information only once. The affected node uses this same polluted information during all subsequent repair
and data collection processes. Static errors represent a common type of data corruption due to wear out of
storage devices, such as latent disk errors or other physical defects of the storage media, where the data stored
on a node is permanently distorted.
2) Dynamic errors: an omniscient adversary may replace the content of an affected node each time the node
is asked for its data during data collection or repair process. This kind of errors captures any malicious
behaviour, hence is more difficult to manage in comparison with static errors.
We present a novel concatenated coding scheme for DSS which provides resilience against these two classes of
attacks and allow for either optimal repair bandwidth or optimal local node repairs. In our scheme for an optimal
repair bandwidth DSS, the content to be stored is first encoded using a maximum rank distance (MRD) code. The
output of this outer code is further encoded using a regenerating code, which allows for bandwidth efficient node
repairs. Using an MRD code, which is an optimal rank-metric code, allows us to quantify the errors introduced in
the system using their rank as opposed to their Hamming weights. The dynamic nature of the DSS causes a large
number of nodes to get polluted even by a single erroneous node, as false information spreads from node repairs.
Thus, a single polluted node infects many others, resulting in an error vector with a large Hamming weight. Using
rank-metric codes can help alleviate this problem as the error that a data collector has to handle has a known
rank, and can therefore be corrected by an MRD code with a sufficient rank distance. Using an (n, k) bandwidth
efficient MDS array code as inner code facilitates bandwidth efficient node repair in the event of a single node
failure and allows the data collector to recover the original data from any subset of k storage nodes. In this paper,
we use exact-regenerating linear bandwidth efficient codes operating at the minimum-storage regenerating (MSR)
point [1]. However, our construction can be utilized for regenerating codes operating at any other point of repair
bandwidth vs. per node storage trade-off.
Further, we focus on error resilience for locally repairable DSS. We present a bound on the resilience capacity
for such DSS. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work which considers the issue of error resilience for
locally repairable codes. Then we show that our scheme based on MRD codes can be applied to LRC codes as
well. In addition, we consider error resilience in codes with optimal bandwidth local regeneration, where MSR or
MBR codes are utilized as local codes [18], [20], [34].
Our coding schemes are directly applicable to the static error model and are optimal in terms of amount of data
that can be reliably stored on a DSS under static error model. The model with dynamic errors is more complicated,
as it permits a single malicious node to change its pollution pattern, and introduce an arbitrarily large error both in
Hamming weight and in rank. For dynamic error model, we present two solutions based on the concatenated coding
scheme employed for static error model. (We consider only the solutions for a secure regenerating code, as for a
secure locally repairable code the same ideas can be applied). One solution is to exploit the inherent redundancy
in the encoded data due to outer code, i.e., an MRD code, and perform error free node repair even in the presence
of adversarial nodes. This solution, a naı¨ve method, is optimal for a specific choice of parameters. An alternative
solution combines our concatenated coding scheme with subspace signature based cryptographic schemes to control
3the amount (rank) of pollution (error) introduced by an adversarial node. We employ the signature scheme by Zhao
et al. [35], which essentially reduces the dynamic error model to the one similar to a static error model, and helps us
bound the rank of error introduced by an adversarial node. Note that hash function based solutions have previously
been presented in the context of DSS to deal with errors [28], [30]. While promising, these hash functions based
approaches provide only probabilistic guarantees for pollution containment.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section II, we start with a description of our system model and
provide a brief overview of rank-metric, regenerating and locally repairable codes. In Section III, we consider the
static error model. First, we describe the construction of our storage scheme which allows for bandwidth efficient
repairs and prove its error resilience. Second, we consider error resilience in LRCs. We provide a upper bound on
the resiliency capacity and present modifications of our scheme which enable optimal local repairs. In Section IV,
we address the dynamic error model. We conclude with Section V, where we list a set of open problems.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. System model
Let M be the size of a file f over a finite field F that needs to be stored on a DSS with n nodes. Each node
contains α symbols over F. A data collector reconstructs the original file f by downloading the data stored on any
set of k out of n nodes. This property of a DSS is called ‘any k out of n’ property, and we use (n, k)-DSS to
represent a storage system which has ‘any k out of n’ property.
B. Rank-metric codes
All the constructions of coding schemes for distributed storage systems provided in this paper are based on a
family of error correcting codes in rank metric, called Gabidulin codes.
Let Fqm be an extension field of Fq. Since Fqm can be also considered as an m-dimensional vector space over
Fq, any element γ ∈ Fqm can be represented as the vector γ = (γ1, . . . , γm) ∈ Fmq , such that γ =
∑m
i=1 biγi, for a
fixed basis {b1, . . . , bm} of the field extension. Similarly, any vector v = (v1, . . . , vN ) ∈ FNqm can be represented
by an m×N matrix V = [vi,j ] over Fq, where each entry vi of v is expanded as a column vector (vi,1, . . . , vi,m)T .
The rank of a vector v ∈ FNqm , denoted by rank(v), is defined as the rank of the m × N matrix V over Fq.
Similarly, for two vectors v,u ∈ FNqm , the rank distance is defined by
dR(v,u) = rank(V −U).
An [N,K,D]qm rank-metric code C ⊆ FNqm is a linear block code over Fqm of length N , dimension K and
minimum rank distance D. A rank-metric code that attains the Singleton bound D ≤ N − K + 1 for the rank
metric is called a maximum rank distance (MRD) code [36]–[38]. For m ≥ N , a construction of MRD codes
was presented by Gabidulin [37]. Similar to Reed-Solomon codes, Gabidulin codes can be obtained by evaluation
of polynomials; however, for Gabidulin codes, a special family of polynomials linearized polynomials is used. A
linearized polynomial f(x) over Fqm of q-degree t has the form f(x) =
∑t
i=0 aix
qi , where ai ∈ Fqm , and at 6= 0.
Remark 1. Note, that evaluation of a linearized polynomial is an Fq-linear transformation from Fqm to itself, i.e.,
for any a, b ∈ Fq and γ1, γ2 ∈ Fqm , we have f(aγ1 + bγ2) = af(γ1) + bf(γ2) [39].
A codeword of an [N,K,D = N−K+1]qm Gabidulin code CGab is defined as c = (f(g1), f(g2), . . . , f(gN )) ∈
FNqm , for m ≥ N , where f(x) is a linearized polynomial over Fqm of q-degree at most K − 1 with K message
symbols as its coefficients, and the evaluation points g1, . . . , gN ∈ Fqm are linearly independent over Fq [37].
1) Rank Errors and Rank Erasures Correction: Let CGab ⊆ FNqm be a Gabidulin code with the minimum
distance D. Let c ∈ CGab be the transmitted codeword and let r = c+etotal be the received word. The code CGab
can correct any vector error of the form
etotal = eerror + eerasure = (e1u1 + . . .+ etut) + (r1v1 + . . .+ rsvs), (1)
as long as 2t + s ≤ D − 1. The first part eerror is called a rank error of rank t, where ei ∈ Fqm are linearly
independent over the base field Fq, unknown to the decoder, and ui ∈ FNq are linearly independent vectors of
length N , unknown to the decoder. The second part eerasure is called a rank erasure, where ri ∈ Fqm are linearly
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Fig. 1: Illustration of the second node repair process in (5, 3) Zigzag code: (a) for error free system, (b) for system
with erroneous information at the first storage node.
independent over the base field Fq, unknown to the decoder, and vi ∈ FNq are linearly independent vectors of
length N , and known to the decoder. (In this paper we are interested only in rank column erasures, so the rank
row erasures are not considered). [37], [40] present decoding algorithms for rank-metric codes.
Note that an [N,K,D]qm MRD code is in particular an MDS code over Fqm , and then can correct erasures of
any D − 1 symbols in a codeword. Such symbols erasures are in particular column erasures, when the codeword
is considered in the matrix representation.
C. Vector codes
A linear [n,M, dmin, α]F vector code C of length n over a finite field F is defined as a linear subspace of Fαn
of dimension M. The symbols ci, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, of a codeword c ∈ C belong to Fα, i.e., are vectors or blocks of
size α. The minimum distance dmin of C is defined as the minimum Hamming distance over Fα.
Vector codes are also known as array codes. An [n,M, dmin, α]F array code is called MDS array code if α|M
and dmin = n− Mα + 1. Constructions for MDS array codes can be found e.g. in [41], [42].
In order to store a file f ∈ FM on a DSS using a vector code C, f is first encoded to a codeword c =
(c1, c2, . . . , cn) ∈ C. Each symbol (block) ci ∈ Fα of the codeword is then stored on a distinct node.
D. Regenerating codes
Regenerating codes are a family of vectors codes for an (n, k)-DSS that allow for efficient repair of failed nodes.
When a node fails, its content can be reconstructed by downloading β ≤ α symbols from each node in a set of
d, k ≤ d ≤ n − 1, surviving nodes. We denote by [n,M, dmin = n − k + 1, α, β, d]F a linear regenerating code.
Note that data can be reconstructed from any k symbols of a codeword and therefore the minimum distance is
dmin = n − k + 1. A trade-off between storage per node α and repair bandwidth γ , dβ was established in [1].
Two classes of codes that achieve two extreme points of this trade-off are known as minimum storage regenerating
(MSR) codes and minimum bandwidth regenerating (MBR) codes. The parameters (α, γ) for MSR and MBR codes
are given by
(
M
k ,
Md
k(d−k+1)
)
and
(
2Md
2kd−k2+k ,
2Md
2kd−k2+k
)
, respectively [1].
In this paper we focus on the family of linear MSR codes. Note that these codes are also MDS array codes. We
refer to these codes as [n,M = αk, dmin = n− k + 1, α, β = αd−k+1 , d]F optimal repair MDS array codes.
Let x = (x1,x2, . . . ,xk) ∈ Fαk, k = Mα , be an information vector (a file), xi ∈ Fα is a block of size α, for all
1 ≤ i ≤ k. These k blocks are encoded into n encoded blocks yi ∈ Fα, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, stored in n nodes of size α, in
the following way:
y = xG,
where y = (y1,y2, . . . ,yn) and the generator matrix G of an MSR code is an k × n block matrix over F with
blocks of size α× α given by:
G =

A1,1 A1,2 . . . A1,n
A2,1 A2,2 . . . A2,n
...
...
. . .
...
Ak,1 Ak,2 . . . Ak,n
 .
5Note that any blocks submatrix of G of size k × k is of the full rank. For a systematic code, we have yi = xi,
for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, and a parity node j, k + 1 ≤ j ≤ n, stores yj =
∑k
i=1 xiAi,j .
When a node i fails, each node j in a set of d surviving nodes that are contacted to repair this node sends a
vector of length β given by yjVj,i, where Vj,i ∈ Fα×β is a repair matrix used by node j to perform repair of node i.
1) Example of Optimal Repair MDS Array Codes: In the following, we present an example of optimal repair
MDS array codes for DSS, which we use in Section III-A to illustrate our coding scheme.
Example 1. (Zigzag code [6]). This class of optimal repair MDS array codes [6] is based on generalized
permutation matrices. For an [n = 5,M = 12, dmin = 3, α = 4, β = 2, d = 4]q zigzag code presented in
Fig. 1a, first three nodes are systematic nodes which store the data (c1, c2, . . . , c12), each one α = 4 information
symbols. The block generator matrix for this code is given by
G =
 I 0 0 I I0 I 0 I A2
0 0 I I A3
 ,
where I and 0 denote the identity matrix and all-zero matrix of size 4× 4, respectively; and
A2 =

0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
2 0 0 0
0 2 0 0
 , A3 =

0 1 0 0
2 0 0 0
0 0 0 2
0 0 1 0
 .
Fig. 1a describes node repair process for this code. When the second node fails, the newcomer node downloads
the symbols from the shaded locations at the surviving nodes.
E. Locally repairable codes
Locally repairable codes (LRCs) are a family of codes for DSS that allow to reduce the number of nodes
participating in the node repair process. LRCs are defined as follows.
We say that an [n,M, dmin, α]F vector code C is a (r, δ, α) locally repairable code if for each symbol ci ∈ Fα,
1 ≤ i ≤ n, of a codeword c = (c1, . . . , cn) ∈ C, there exists a set of indices Γ(i) such that
• i ∈ Γ(i)
• |Γ(i)| ≤ r + δ − 1
• dmin(C|Γ(i)) ≥ δ, where C|Γ(i) denotes the puncturing of C on the set [n]\Γ(i) of coordinates.
Note that the last two properties imply that each element j ∈ Γ(i) can be written as a function of a set of at
most r elements in Γ(i) (not containing j).
It was proven in [18], [20] that the minimum distance of an (r, δ, α) LRC of length n and dimensionM satisfies
dmin(C) ≤ n−
⌈M
α
⌉
+ 1−
(⌈M
rα
⌉
− 1
)
(δ − 1). (2)
We say that an (r, δ, α) LRC for an (n, n− dmin + 1)-DSS is optimal if its minimum distance dmin attains the
bound (2). In this paper we consider the construction of optimal (r, δ, α) LRCs from [17] (for α = 1) and its
generalization from [18]. This construction is based on concatenation of Gabidulin codes and MDS array codes: a
file f over F = FqN of size M≥ rα is first encoded using an [N,M, D]qN Gabidulin code. The codeword of the
Gabidulin code is then partitioned into local disjoint groups, each of size rα, and each local group is then encoded
using an [(r + δ − 1), r, δ, α]q MDS array code over Fq. (If rα - N , there is a group of size r′α < rα, which is
then encoded by using an [(r′+ δ− 1), r′, δ, α]q MDS array code). A code obtained by this construction is optimal
if (r + δ − 1)|n, N = nrαr+δ−1 and q ≥ (r + δ − 1). For a case when (r + δ − 1) - n, see the details in [18].
1) Example of Optimal LRC: The following example of optimal LRC will be used further for illustration of our
error-correcting coding scheme.
Example 2. We consider a DSS with the following parameters:
(M, n, r, δ, α) = (28, 15, 3, 3, 4).
Let f be a file of size 28 over Fq36 , q ≥ 5. Let N = 15·3·43+3−1 = 36 and (a1, . . . , a12, b1, . . . , b12, c1, . . . , c12) be a
codeword of a [36, 28, 9]q36 Gabidulin code CGab, which is obtained by encoding M = 28 symbols over F = Fq36
6of the original file. The Gabidulin codeword is then partitioned into three groups (a1, . . . , a12), (b1, . . . , b12), and
(c1, . . . , c12). Encoded symbols in each group are stored on three storage nodes as shown in Fig. 2. In the second
stage of encoding, a [5, 3 · 4, 3, 4]q MDS array code over Fq is applied on each local group to obtain δ − 1 = 2
parity nodes per local group. The coding scheme is illustrated in Fig. 2.
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Fig. 2: Example of an (r = 3, δ = 3, α = 4) LRC with n = 15 and dmin = 5.
By (2) we have dmin(C loc) ≤ 5. One can check that every 4 nodes failures (which is equivalent to at most 8
rank erasures [18]) can be corrected by this code, and thus it has minimum distance 5. In addition, when a single
node fails, it can be repaired by using the data stored on any three other nodes from the same group.
F. Adversarial errors models
We assume the presence of an omniscient active adversary which can observe all nodes of (n, k)-DSS and has
full knowledge of the coding scheme employed by the system but can modify at most t nodes, 2t < k, similarly
to [30].
Our goal is to design a coding scheme for an (n, k)-DSS that allows to deliver the original data to a data collector
even in presence of t nodes (t < k/2) which are fully controlled by an adversary.
In this paper we consider two classes of adversarial attacks:
1) Static errors: an adversary replaces the content of each affected node with nonsensical information only
once. The affected node uses this same polluted information during all subsequent repair and data collection
processes.
2) Dynamic errors: an adversary may replace the content of an affected node each time the node is asked for
the data during data collection or repair process.
As it was mentioned in Introduction, static errors represent a common type of data corruption due to wear out
of storage devices, such as latent disk errors or other physical defects of the storage media, where the data stored
on a node is permanently distorted. Dynamic errors represent the most general scenario and hence is more difficult
to manage as compared to static errors.
The upper bound on the amount of data that can be stored reliably on an (n, k)-DSS with t < k2 general corrupted
nodes (i.e., t dynamic errors) which employs a regenerating code was presented by Pawar et al. [30]. This amount
of data is called resilience capacity and denoted by Ct(α, β, d). The bound on the resilience capacity is given by
Ct(α, β, d) ≤
k∑
i=2t+1
min{(d− i+ 1)β, α}. (3)
Remark 2. Although the static error model is less general than the model considered in [30], the upper bound
in (3) applies to the static model as well. Pawar et al. [30] obtain the upper bound in (3) by evaluating a
cut of the information flow graph corresponding to a particular node failure sequence, pattern of nodes under
adversarial attack and data collector. This information flow graph is also valid in the context of the static error
model. Consequently, its cut which provides an upper bound on the information flow and represents the amount of
data that can be reliably stored on DSS is applicable to the static error model as well. As shown in this paper,
this bound is tight for static model at the MSR point, which might not be the case for the general error model
considered in [30].
7III. CODING SCHEMES FOR STATIC ERROR MODEL
In this section we consider the static error model. First, we present our coding scheme for DSS which employ
optimal repair MDS array codes. Next, we provide an upper bound on the resilience capacity for locally repairable
codes and present a coding scheme for DSS which employ optimal locally repairable codes. We prove the error
tolerance of the proposed schemes under the static error model. We illustrate the idea by using examples from
Section II-D1 and Section II-E1 and prove that these constructions are optimal for the static error model. Finally,
we consider error resilience in LRCs with local regeneration.
A. Error resilience in optimal repair MDS array codes
1) Construction of Error-Correcting Optimal Repair MDS Array Codes: First, we present a concatenated coding
scheme which is based on a Gabidulin code as an outer code and an optimal repair MDS array code as an inner
code:
Construction I. Let n, k, α, β, d be the given parameters and let M, N,m be the positive integers such that
N = αk and M ≤ N ≤ m. Consider a file f over F = Fqm of size M. We encode the file in two steps
before storing it on an (n, k)-DSS. First, the file is encoded using an [N,M, D = N −M + 1]qm Gabidulin
code CGab, with N evaluation points g1, . . . , gN from F, which are linearly independent over Fq, as described in
Section II-B. Second, the codeword cf = (f(g1), . . . , f(gN )) ∈ CGab that corresponds to the file f is encoded using an
[n,N, dmin, α, β, d]Fq optimal repair MDS array (systematic) code CMDS over Fq, where N = αk, dmin = n−k+1,
and β = αd−k+1 , as described in Section II-D: the codeword cf is partitioned into k blocks of size α, which are
encoded into n blocks of size α (over F) and then stored on n system nodes.
Note, that we use the optimal repair MDS array code defined CMDS over Fq ⊆ F, i.e., its generator matrix is
over Fq, and during the process of node repair, a set of surviving nodes transmits linear combinations of the stored
elements with the coefficients from Fq.
The following lemma is useful to show the properties of the constructed code.
Lemma 1. Any k different nodes of the proposed scheme contain evaluation of the linearized polynomial f(x)
(corresponding to the given file) at αk elements of F which are linearly independent over Fq. In other words, the
content of any k nodes corresponds to a codeword of an [N = αk,M, D = N −M+ 1]F Gabidulin code ĈGab.
Proof: Let g1, . . . , gN be the evaluation points of the Gabidulin code CGab used in the construction. Consider
a set S = {i1, . . . ik} of nodes. The content of these nodes is given by cfGS , where GS = (ai,j)αki,j=1 is
a αk × αk submatrix of the generator matrix G of CMDS which corresponds to the nodes in S, i.e., which
consists of columns {(ij − 1)α+ 1, . . . , ijα}kj=1. The jth coordinate of the vector cfGS of length αk is given by
(cfGS)j = (f(g1), . . . , f(gαk))(a1,j , . . . , aαk,j)T =
∑αk
i=1 ai,jf(gi) = f(
∑αk
i=1 ai,jgi), where (a1,j , . . . , aαk,j)
T is
the jth column of GS and the last equality follows from the Fq-linearity of f . Now consider the vector of the new
evaluation points of f : (ĝ1, . . . ĝαk) = (
∑αk
i=1 ai,1gi, . . . ,
∑αk
i=1 ai,αkgi) = (g1, . . . , gαk)GS .
Note that since CMDS is an MDS array code, then GS is a full rank matrix over Fq. Therefore, {ĝ1, . . . ĝαk}
are linearly independent over Fq if and only if {g1, . . . , gαk} are linearly independent over Fq. Therefore, the
observations cfGS are essentially evaluations of linearized polynomial at kα linearly independent points over Fq
from F, which correspond to a codeword of an [N = αk,M, D = N −M+ 1]F Gabidulin code ĈGab. Note that
ĈGab has the same parameters as CGab, however, the evaluation points of these two codes are different.
The following theorem shows that if 2tα+ 1 ≤ D, then the proposed scheme tolerates up to t erroneous nodes,
i.e., from any k nodes a data collector can retrieve the original data even in presence of an adversary which controls
(modifies) t nodes. Note that the node repairs are performed exactly in the same way as in an error-free DSS.
Theorem 2. Let t be the number of erroneous nodes in the system based on concatenation of Gabidulin and optimal
repair MDS array codes from Construction I. If 2tα+ 1 ≤ D, then the original data can be recovered from any k
nodes.
Proof: Let cf ∈ F be the codeword in CGab which corresponds to the file f , and let (x1,x2, . . . ,xk), xi ∈ Fα,
be the partition of cf into k parts of size α each. Let (y1,y2, . . . ,yn), yi ∈ Fα be the encoded by CMDS blocks
stored on n nodes. Let S = {i1, i2, . . . , it} be the set of indices of the erroneous nodes. Hence the ij th node,
ij ∈ S, contains
∑k
`=1 x`A`,ij +e
ij , where eij = (eij1 , e
ij
2 , . . . , e
ij
α ) ∈ Fα denotes an adversarial error introduced by
8the ij th node, and A`,ij ∈ Fα×αq are the blocks of the generator matrix of CMDS. When the failed nodes are being
repaired, the errors from adversarial nodes propagate to the repaired nodes. In particular, `th node, 1 ≤ ` ≤ n,
contains
∑k
j=1 xjAj,` +
∑t
j=1 e
ijB
ij
` , where B
ij
` ∈ Fα×αq represents the propagation of error eij and depends on
the specific choice of an optimal repair MDS array code. Suppose a data collector contacts k nodes indexed by
D ⊂ [n] and downloads ∑kj=1 xjAj,i +∑tj=1 eijBiji from node i ∈ D.
• Case 1. If these k nodes are all systematic nodes, then we obtain (x1,x2, . . . ,xk) + eB = cf + eB, where
B ∈ Fαt×αkq is the blocks matrix with the (j, `)th block of B is given by Bij` , 1 ≤ ` ≤ k, 1 ≤ j ≤ t, and
e = (ei1 , ei2 , . . . , eit) ∈ Fαt.
• Case 2. If not all the k nodes are systematic, we obtain ĉf + eB̂, where the (j, `)th block of the blocks matrix
B̂ ∈ Fαt×αkq is given by Bij` , ` ∈ D, 1 ≤ j ≤ t, e is defined as previously, and ĉf is the codeword of the
Gabidulin code ĈGab with the same parameters as CGab, according to Lemma 1.
In any case, since rank(e) ≤ tα over Fq, and D ≥ 2tα+ 1, a Gabidulin code can correct this error; consequently,
by applying erasure decoding of the MDS array code (for Case 2) used as inner code the original data can be
recovered.
Now we illustrate the idea of the construction with the help of the example of the optimal repair MDS array code
for an (5, 3)-DSS, presented in Section II-D1. We consider the case where an adversary pollutes the information
stored on a single storage node and demonstrate that the rank of the error introduced by the adversary does not
increase due to node repair dynamics under the static error model. Hence, a data collector can recover the correct
original information using decoders for an MRD code CGab and MDS array code CMDS.
Example 3. Let CGab be an [12, 4, 9]q12 Gabidulin code and let CMDS be the [5, 12, 3, 4, 2, 4]q zigzag code from
Example 1. First we encode a file f = (f0, f1, f2, f3) ∈ F4q12 into a codeword cf = (c1, . . . , c12) ∈ CGab by
ci = f(gi), 1 ≤ i ≤ 12, where {gi, . . . g12} ⊆ Fq12 are linearly independent over Fq and f(x) =
∑3
j=0 fjx
qj . Then
we encode cf again by using CMDS. The first three systematic nodes of (5, 3)-DSS store a codeword cf , i.e., the
content stored in ith systematic node, 1 ≤ i ≤ 3, is yi = (c4(i−1)+1, . . . , c4i) ∈ F4. Let us assume that an adversary
attacks the first storage node and introduces erroneous information. The erroneous information at the first node
can be modeled as y1 + e = (c1, c2, c3, c4) + (e1, e2, e3, e4). Now assume that the second node fails. The system is
oblivious to the presence of pollution at the first node, and employs an exact regeneration strategy to reconstruct the
second node. The reconstructed node downloads the symbols from the shaded locations at the surviving nodes, as
described in Fig. 1b, and solves a linear system of equations to obtain (c5, c6, c7, c8)+(−e1,−e2,−2−1e1,−2−1e2),
where 2−1 denotes the inverse element of 2 in Fq, q ≥ 3.
• Case 1: First assume that a data collector accesses the first three (systematic) nodes to recover the original
data. The data collector now has c˜ = cf +e[I, B12 , 0], where I and 0 are 4×4 identity and zeroes matrices,
respectively. Note that
B12 =

−1 0 −2−1 0
0 −1 0 −2−1
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
 . (4)
• Case 2: Assume that a data collector accesses the first, second, and the fourth nodes to recover the original
data. In this case, the data collector has c˜ = ĉf + e[I, B12 , 0], where I , 0, and B
1
2 are defined as previously,
and ĉf = (c1, c2, . . . , c8, c1 + c5 + c9, c2 + c6 + c10, c3 + c7 + c11, c4 + c8 + c12) is a codeword of a [12, 4, 9]q12
Gabidulin code ĈGab with evaluation points {g1, g2, . . . , g8, g1+g5+g9, g2+g6+g10, g3+g7+g11, g4+g8+g12}.
In any case, c˜ contains an error of rank at most 4. Since the minimum rank distance of codes CGab and ĈGab is
9, the codeword c ∈ CGab (for Case 1) and the codeword ĉ ∈ ĈGab (for Case 2) can be correctly decoded. Now,
this allows the original information f to be recovered by (1) (and by applying the erasure decoding of CMDS in
Case 2).
2) Optimality of Construction I: Next, we show that our concatenated scheme attains the upper bound (3) on
resilience capacity and thus, is optimal (see Remark 2).
First, we note that for an [n,M, dmin, α, β, d]F optimal repair MDS code it holds that β = αd−k+1 and hence the
9upper bound (3) on the resilience capacity can be rewritten as
Ct(α, β, d) ≤
k∑
i=2t+1
min{(d− i+ 1) α
d− k + 1 , α} = α(k − 2t). (5)
Let the set of parameters {M, n, k, α, β, d,N,m,D} be as described in the construction of Section III-A1. Then
N =M+D − 1 and N = αk. Let t be an integer such that D = 2tα+ 1. Then αk =M+D − 1 =M+ 2tα,
and hence M = α(k − 2t). Thus, our concatenated coding scheme achieves the bound in (5).
Remark 3. The authors in [30] provided an explicit construction of codes that attain the bound in (5) for bandwidth-
limited regime. However, this construction has practical limitations for large values of t since the decoding algorithm
presented in [30] is exponential in t. On the other hand, the decoding of codewords in the construction presented
in our paper is efficient as it is based on two efficient decoding algorithms: one for an optimal repair MDS array
code, and other one for a Gabidulin code. However, our coding scheme provides resilience for a weaker model of
adversarial errors.
Remark 4. In [31], Rashmi et al. consider a scenario, referred as ‘erasure’, where some nodes which are supposed
to provide data during node repair become unavailable. It is easy to see from (1) that our construction can also
correct such erasures, as long as the minimum distance of the MRD code used as an outer code is large enough.
The codes obtained by our construction also attain the bound on the capacity derived in [31]. Here, we note that
while our construction works with any MSR code and in particular with an MSR code with high rate, it provides
a solution for a restricted error model, i.e., static errors.
B. Error resilience in optimal LRCs
In this subsection we study DSS which employ locally repairable codes in the presence of errors. We consider
only optimal LRCs, i.e., we consider an (n, n− dmin + 1)-DSS where dmin attains the upper bound (2). First, we
provide an upper bound on the resilience capacity and then we present a coding scheme which attains this bound
for the static errors.
1) Resilience Capacity for LRCs: In the following, we derive an upper bound on the amount of data that can
be reliably stored on a DSS employing an LRC which contains corrupted nodes.
We denote by Ct(r, δ, α) the resilience capacity of an (n, n − dmin + 1)-DSS which employs an (r, δ, α) LRC
in the presence of t corrupted nodes (for any type of errors). In other words, a data collector contacting any
n − dmin + 1 storage nodes can reconstruct the original data of size Ct(r, δ, α) stored on DSS in the presence of
at most t adversarial storage nodes.
Theorem 3. Consider an (n, n− dmin + 1)-DSS which employs an (r, δ, α) LRC. If there are at most t corrupted
nodes, then the upper bound on the resilience capacity is given by
Ct(r, δ, α) ≤ (ρr − 2t)α+ min{hα, rα}, (6)
where ρ =
⌊
n−dmin+1
r+δ−1
⌋
, h = (n− dmin + 1)− ρ(r + δ − 1), and 2t < ρr + min{h, r}.
Proof: We assume that the LRC under consideration has g disjoint local groups, as the upper bound on the
minimum distance for LRCs is achievable only if the local groups of the code are disjoint [20]. We use vector
τ = (τ1, τ2, . . . , τg) to denote an adversarial node pattern, where τi denotes the number of adversarial nodes in ith
local group and
∑g
i=1 τi = t. Note that during a node repair a newcomer node contacts any r out of r + δ − 2
surviving nodes in its local group and downloads all the data stored on these r nodes in order to regenerate the
failed node. To obtain the upper bound, we evaluate the value of a cut in the information flow graph for this DSS.
Similarly to [18], we consider a data collector which contacts r + δ − 1 nodes from each of first ρ =
⌊
n−dmin+1
r+δ−1
⌋
local groups and h = (n− dmin + 1)− ρ(r+ δ− 1) nodes from (ρ+ 1)th local group. Then we have the following
cut value CUT
CUT = ρrα+ min{hα, rα}. (7)
Next, we consider the adversarial node pattern τ = (τ1 = r, τ2 = r, . . . , τbt/rc = r, τbt/rc+1 = t−r
⌊
t
r
⌋
, τbt/rc+2 =
0, . . . , τg = 0). We further assume that in each local group we have repaired r + δ − 1 − r = δ − 1 nodes by
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contacting remaining r nodes and adversarial nodes always belong to non-repaired nodes. Further, we divide the
independent symbols contributing to the value of CUT into three groups:
1) M1: tα symbols corresponding to t adversarial nodes.
2) M2: tα symbols from t intact nodes.
3) M3: CUT− 2tα remaining symbols after excluding M1 and M2 from CUT.
Next, we use an argument similar to that used in [30]. Note that M1 and M2 can not carry any information to
the data collector: Without the knowledge of the identity of adversarial nodes, the data collector can not decide
which one of two sets of symbols {M1,M3} or {M2,M3} corresponds to legitimate information. Therefore, the
data collector relies on symbols associated with M3 to reconstruct the original file. This gives us the following
bound on the resilience capacity:
Ct(r, δ, α) ≤ CUT− 2tα = (ρr − 2t)α+ min{hα, rα}.
2) Construction of Error-Correcting Optimal LRC: In this subsection we present a concatenated coding scheme,
also based on a Gabidulin and MDS array codes, for error-correcting locally repairable codes and prove the
optimality of this construction for static errors model.
Construction II. Let n, dmin, r, δ, α be the given parameters. (We assume for simplicity that (r + δ − 1)|n).
Let M,M′, N,m, ρ, h be the positive integers such that M′ ≤ M ≤ N ≤ m, rα ≤ M = ρrα + min{h, r}α,
N = nrαr+δ−1 , ρ =
⌊
n−dmin+1
r+δ−1
⌋
, h = (n − dmin + 1) − ρ(r + δ − 1), and dmin attains the bound (2), i.e., dmin =
n− ⌈Mα ⌉+ 1− (⌈Mrα⌉− 1) (δ − 1).
Consider a file f of size M′ over F = Fqm . The encoding is identical to the encoding for LRC, presented in
Subsection II-E, the only difference is that we apply an [N,M′, D = N −M′ + 1]qm Gabidulin code CGab in the
first step of the encoding: Let cf = (f(g1), . . . , f(gN )) be the codeword of CGab that corresponds to the file f ,
where g1, . . . , gN ∈ F are evaluation points for the Gabidulin code, which are linearly independent over Fq. This
codeword is partitioned into local disjoint groups, each one of size rα and then each local group is encoded using
an [(r + δ − 1), r, δ, α]q MDS array code (over Fq).
The following theorem shows the error resilience of the proposed code. Note, that the node repairs of this scheme
are performed exactly in the same (local) way as in an error-free LRC.
Theorem 4. Let t be the number of erroneous nodes in the system which employs a dmin-optimal LRC based
on concatenation of Gabidulin and MDS array codes, from Construction II. If the minimum distance D of the
underlying Gabidulin code satisfies D ≥ 2tα + ( nr+δ−1 −
⌊
n−dmin+1
r+δ−1
⌋
)rα − min{hα, rα} + 1, then the original
data can be recovered from any n− dmin + 1 nodes.
Proof: We consider the worst case data collector which contacts n − dmin + 1 nodes which belong to ρ (or
ρ+ 1) different groups, (r+ δ−1)|(n−dmin + 1) (or (r+ δ−1) - (n−dmin + 1) ), which contain all the corrupted
nodes. During the node repairs, an error spreads to at most all the nodes which belong to the same local group that
contains an erroneous node. Based on Lemma 1 the data collector obtains
⌊
n−dmin+1
r+δ−1
⌋
rα+ min{hα, rα} symbols
of the corresponding Gabidulin code, which can contain an error of rank at most tα, similarly to the proof of
Theorem 2. Therefore, this corresponds to tα rank errors and N −
⌊
n−dmin+1
r+δ−1
⌋
rα −min{hα, rα} rank erasures.
Thus the statement of the theorem follows from the fact that N = nr+δ−1rα,
Next, we will show that our error-correcting LRC attains the upper bound on the resilience capacity of Theorem 3,
for a static errors model.
Corollary 1. Let CLRC be the LRC for (n, n−dmin +1)-DSS obtained from Construction II and let t be the number
of corrupted nodes, where 2t < ρr+ min{h, r}, for ρ and h defined in Theorem 3. If the corresponding Gabidulin
code has the minimum distance D = 2tα+ ( nr+δ−1 − ρ)rα−min{hα, rα}+ 1 then CLRC attains the bound (6) on
the resilience capacity.
Proof: We need to prove that M′ = (ρr − 2t)α + min{hα, rα}. Since the corresponding [N,M′, D]qm
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Gabidulin code is an MRD code, it holds that M′ = N −D + 1. Then
M′ = nrα
r + δ − 1 − (2tα+
(
n
r + δ − 1 − ρ
)
rα−min{hα, rα}+ 1) + 1
= ρrα− 2tα+ min{hα, rα}.
Now we illustrate the idea of the Construction II. We consider the case where an adversary pollutes the information
stored on a single storage node.
Example 4. Consider the code of Example 2 with additional parameters t = 1 and M′ = 20. The Gabidulin
code used in the first step of the encoding is the [36, 20, 17]q36 code CGab and the MDS array code used in the
second step of the construction is the (5, 3) zigzag code from Example 1. Here we have ρ = 2 and h = 1. In other
words, the system stores a file f of size 20 over Fq36 , and a data collector should reconstruct this file from any
n−dmin +1 = 15−5+1 = 11 nodes. Let us assume that an adversary attacks the third storage node and introduces
erroneous information. The erroneous information at the third node is modeled as (a9, a10, a11, a12)+(e1, e2, e3, e4).
Now assume that the second node fails. The system is oblivious to the presence of pollution at the third node, and
employs the erasure decoding of the [5, 3 · 4, 3, 4]q MDS code to reconstruct the second node: Assume that the
reconstructed node downloads all the symbols from the first, the third and the fifth nodes and solves a linear system
of equations to obtain (a5, a6, a7, a8) + (−e4,−2e3,−e2,−2−1e1), where 2−1 denotes the inverse element of 2 in
Fq, q ≥ 3.
Assume that a data collector contacts 11 first nodes (ρ = 2 full groups, 5 nodes in each one, and h = 1 node
in the additional group). He obtains 12 + 12 + 4 symbols corresponding to the Gabidulin codeword cf (which is
of length 36), where these 28 symbols contain an error of rank at most 4:
cf + (e1, e2, e3, e4)[0, B2, I4,04×24] + (c5, . . . , c12)[08×28,−I8],
where Im denotes the identity matrix of order m, 0a×b denotes a × b matrix with all of its entries equal to zero,
and B2 is defined as follows:
B2 =

0 0 0 −2−1
0 0 −1 0
0 −2 0 0
−1 0 0 0
 .
In other words, we have 8 erasures in the Gabidulin codeword and at most 4 rank errors. Since the distance of
CGab is D = 17, by (1) the original data is recovered by applying errors and erasures correction of the Gabidulin
code. (Note that (e1, e2, e3, e4), [0, B2, I,04×24], (c5, . . . , c12) are unknown to the decoder but [08×28,−I8] is
known to the decoder).
C. Error resilience in LRCs with local regeneration
In this section, we discuss the hybrid codes which for a given locality parameters minimize the repair bandwidth.
These codes, as proposed in [18] and [20], are obtained by combining locally repairable codes with regenerating
codes.
In a repair process for an original LRC, a newcomer node contacts r nodes in its local group and downloads all
the data stored on these nodes. To allow a reduction in repair bandwidth, the idea of regenerating codes is used
for the hybrid codes. In particular, a newcomer node contacts any d ≥ r nodes in its local group and downloads
only β ≤ α symbols stored on these nodes in order to repair the failed node, in other words, a regenerating code
is applied in each local group.
That is, when an [r + δ − 1, r, δ, α, β, d]Fq MSR code is applied in each local group instead of an MDS array
code in the second step of construction of LRC presented in subsection II-E, then the resulting code, denoted by
MSR-LRC, has the maximal minimum distance (since an MSR code is also an MDS array code), the local minimum
storage per node, and the minimized repair bandwidth. (The details of this construction and its properties can be
found in [18].) Also, when an MBR code is applied in each local group instead of an MDS array code in the second
step of construction of LRC presented in subsection II-E, then the resulting code, denoted by MBR-LRC, has the
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maximal possible minimum distance, and the local minimum repair bandwidth. (The details of this construction
and its properties can be found in [34].)
In the following, we consider error resilience for MSR-LRC and for MBR-LRC. In particular, we provide a upper
bound on the resilience capacity for these codes and consider construction for error-correcting MSR-LRC and MBR-
LRC. We denote by Ct(r, δ, α, β, d)MSR (Ct(r, δ, α, β, d)MBR) the resilience capacity of an (n, n− dmin + 1)-DSS
which employs an (r, δ, α, β, d) MSR-LRC (MBR-LRC) in the presence of t corrupted nodes.
Theorem 5. Consider an (n, n−dmin+1)-DSS which employs an (r, δ, α, β, d) MSR-LRC (MBR-LRC), for r+δ−1 >
d > r. If there are at most t corrupted nodes, then the upper bound on the resilience capacity of MSR-LRC is
given by
Ct(r, δ, α, β, d)MSR ≤
(
ρ− 2
⌊
t
d
⌋)
rα+ (min{h, r} − 2 min{γ, r})α,
and the resilience capacity for the MBR-LRC is upper bounded by
Ct(r, δ, α, β, d)MBR ≤ min{term I, term II},
where
term I =
(
ρ− 2
⌊
t
d
⌋)
BMBR − 2
min{γ,r}∑
i=1
(d− i+ 1)β +
min{h,r}∑
i=1
(d− i+ 1)β,
term II = ρ˜
d∑
i=2s+1
(d− i+ 1)β + (ρ− ρ˜)
d∑
i=2s˜+1
(d− i+ 1)β +
min{h,d}∑
i=2sˆ+1
(d− i+ 1).β,
Here, ρ =
⌊
n−dmin+1
r+δ−1
⌋
, h = (n − dmin + 1) − ρ(r + δ − 1), γ =
(
t− ⌊ td⌋ d), BMBR = rα − r(r−1)2 β and ρ˜, s, s˜,
and sˆ are such that ρ˜s+ (ρ− ρ˜)s˜+ sˆ = t, 2 max{s, s˜} ≤ d, and 2sˆ ≤ h.
Proof: MSR-LRC: Similarly to the proof of Theorem 3, we evaluate the value of a cut in the corresponding
information flow graph. We again consider a data collector that contacts r + δ − 1 nodes from each of first ρ
local groups and h nodes from (ρ + 1)th local group. We further assume that the pattern of adversarial nodes is
τ = (τ1 = d, τ2 = d, . . . , τbt/dc = d, τbt/dc+1 = t−d
⌊
t
d
⌋
, τbt/dc+2 = 0, . . . , τg = 0). In each group, we assume that
all but d nodes have been repaired at least once. The remaining d nodes are used to repair all node failures. The
corrupted nodes are assumed to be among these d nodes in their local groups. The cut value for the information
flow graph associated with this scenario is given by
CUTMSR = ρrα+ min{hα, rα}. (8)
Similar to the proof of Theorem 3, we divide the independent symbols in CUTMSR into three groups:
1) M1:
⌊
t
d
⌋
rα+ min{γ, r}α symbols corresponding to t adversarial nodes.
2) M2:
⌊
t
d
⌋
rα+ min{γ, r}α symbols from ⌊ td⌋ r + γ intact nodes.
3) M3: CUTMSR − 2
(⌊
t
d
⌋
r + min{γ, r})α remaining symbols after excluding M1 and M2 from CUTMSR.
Again following the argument similar to that for LRCs, we get the following bound on the resilience capacity for
an MSR-LRC:
Ct(r, δ, α, β, d)MSR ≤ CUTMSR − 2
(⌊
t
d
⌋
r + min{γ, r}
)
α
=
(
ρ− 2
⌊
t
d
⌋)
rα+ (min{h, r} − 2 min{γ, r})α.
Note that if t < r then this bound is the same as the bound (6) for LRCs.
MBR-LRC: If we consider the same adversarial node pattern as in case MSR-LRC, we get the following bound
on the resilience capacity for an MBR-LRC:
Ct(r, δ, α, β, d)MBR ≤
(
ρ− 2
⌊
t
d
⌋)
BMBR − 2
min{γ,r}∑
i=1
(d− i+ 1)β +
min{h,r}∑
i=1
(d− i+ 1)β. (9)
13
Alternatively, we consider another pattern of eavesdropped nodes τ = (τ1 = s, τ2 = s, . . . , τρ˜ = s, τρ˜+1 =
s˜, τρ = s˜, τρ+1 = sˆ, τρ+2 = 0, . . . , τg = 0). Here, ρ˜, s, s˜, and sˆ are such that ρ˜s+(ρ− ρ˜)s˜+ sˆ = t, 2 max{s, s˜} ≤ d,
and 2sˆ ≤ min{h, r}. Note that such choice is always possible given the particular choice of data collector and the
assumption that 2t < ρr + min{h, r}. For this pattern of adversarial node, we obtain the following upper bound
on the resilience capacity for an MBR-LRC:
Ct(r, δ, α, β, d)MBR ≤ (ρ− ρ˜)
d∑
i=2s˜+1
(d− i+ 1)β + ρ˜
d∑
i=2s+1
(d− i+ 1)β +
min{h,d}∑
i=2sˆ+1
(d− i+ 1)β. (10)
Now, we can pick minimum of RHS of (9) and (10) as an upper bound on the file size.
1) Construction of Error-Correcting LRC with Local Regeneration: Similarly to the construction of error-
correcting LRCs, where the only difference to the construction of dmin-optimal LRC (without error correction)
is the larger minimum rank distance of the corresponding Gabidulin code, the construction for error-correcting
LRCs with local regeneration is based on the construction of an error-free MSR-LRC (MBR-LRC), where the
Gabidulin code is chosen with larger minimum distance. We note that since for the case t < r the bounds for LRCs
and MSR-LRCs are identical, the optimal codes can be obtained simply by replacement of MDS array codes by
MSR codes in Construction II. However, constructions for optimal error-correcting MSR-LRCs for general cases
and also for optimal error-correcting MBR-LRC codes still remain an open problem.
IV. DYNAMIC ERROR MODEL
In this section, we consider the problem of designing coding schemes for DSS that work under dynamic error
model. Note, that in a static error model each time an attacked node is requested for the data to be sent, it sends
some linear combinations of the data that has been modified on it by an adversary, which the adversary is allowed to
do only once. Therefore, the rank of the error that a single node under static attack causes throughout the operation
of DSS is bounded above by α. This is not the case under the dynamic error model as a single attacked node can
inject an error of large rank if it is utilized in multiple node repairs, which may render the data stored on DSS
useless.
Towards this model, some results are presented in [30] and [31]. The coding scheme proposed in [30] does not
have an efficient decoding during the data reconstruction process and it works specifically with bandwidth efficiently
repairable codes at the MBR point. The coding scheme of [31] deals with the dynamic error model at the MSR
point, but there scheme works only for low rate, i.e., 2k ≤ n+ 1.
Next, we present two solutions to deal with attack under the dynamic error model. The first solution aims to
correct errors during the node repair process. The second approach is based on existing literature on subspace
signatures. All the results presented in this section are given for optimal repair MDS array codes. Since our locally
repairable codes make use of MDS array codes (or MSR codes for codes with local regeneration) in each local
group, the similar ideas can be applied for this family of DSS codes as well.
A. Naı¨ve scheme for dynamic error model
A solution for the dynamic error model is to adopt a repair scheme where a newcomer node utilizes the redundancy
in the downloaded data to perform error-free exact repair even in the presence of errors in the downloaded data.
Next, we analyze the maximum amount of information that can be stored on the DSS employing concatenated
codes proposed in Section III-A1 under the dynamic error model, if an error free node repair is performed.
When a storage node fails, a newcomer node downloads dβ symbols from any d surviving nodes (d ≥ k) (for
MSR code dβ = α+(k−1)β). Since there can be at most t adversarial nodes present in the system, the newcomer
node receives at most tβ erroneous symbols. Therefore, out of kα symbols of a Gabidulin codeword, by Lemma 1,
the newcomer has (k − 1)β + α symbols (using the fact that the inner code is an MDS code and we perform
bandwidth efficient repair). All the other kα− (k − 1)β − α = (α− β)(k − 1) symbols of a Gabidulin codeword
can be considered as the erased symbols. Let M′ denote the number of information symbols (over Fqm) that are
stored on the DSS. Then the minimum distance D of the corresponding Gabidulin code satisfies D = kα−M′+1.
Therefore we can reconstruct the entire Gabidulin codeword and thus the data stored on the failed node, if we have
D = kα−M′ + 1 ≥ 2tβ + (k − 1)(α− β) + 1.
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This gives us
M′ ≤ α+ (k − 2t− 1)β. (11)
Note that the bound in (3) is still applicable. For k = 2t + 1, the right hand side expression in (11) is equal to
that in (3). Therefore, this naı¨ve repair scheme is optimal in terms of the capacity of DSS even in the dynamic
error model. However, the difference between these bounds is monotonically increasing with (k − 2t− 1) and the
solution proposed in this section is suboptimal for general values of system parameters k and t.
Remark 5. In a similar way, it can shown that the LRCs based construction presented in Section III-B is optimal
under dynamic error model when ρr + min{h, r} = 2t+ 1.
B. Subspace signatures approach
As mentioned previously, in the dynamic error model an attacked node can inject a high rank error. Thus, it is
desirable to restrict the rank of the aggregate error that a particular attacked node can cause in the entire system
under dynamic error model. In this subsection, we propose to combine the existing literature on detecting subspace
pollution with MRD codes to counter a dynamic attack. Next, we illustrate this with the help of subspace signatures
proposed in [35].
Let us consider an n-nodes DSS that employs a Gabidulin and a bandwidth efficiently repairable code based
storage scheme as explained in Section III-A1. For node i, content stored on it, i.e. yi ∈ Fα = Fαqm , can be viewed
as an m × α matrix over Fq. These α column vectors of length m stored on ith node span a subspace (column
space of yi when viewed as a matrix over Fq) in Fmq of dimension at most α. Since all elements of the coding
matrix and repair matrices are from Fq, during node repair process node i sends β vectors that lie in the subspace
spanned by yi. If we make sure that even under the dynamic error model an attacked node sends vectors from the
same α-dimensional subspace of Fmq during node repairs and data reconstruction, a data collector encounters at
most tα-rank error, which can be corrected with a Gabidulin code of large enough distance as in the static model.
Subspace signatures solve this problem of enforcing the requirement that a node sends data (vectors) from the same
α-dimensional subspace of Fmq .
We assume existence of a trusted verifier, who stores all n subspace signatures, one signature for each storage
node, generated according to the procedure explained in [35]. Whenever a particular node sends data during a node
repair or data reconstruction, the truster verifier checks the data against the stored subspace signature corresponding
to that particular storage node.
For the purpose of the data reconstruction, whenever a node does not pass the signature test, this node is
considered as α rank erasures. If s ≤ t nodes fail the test during data reconstruction, the data collector deals
with sα rank erasures and (t − s)α rank errors. Given that the outer Gabidulin code has minimum rank distance
2tα+ 1 ≥ 2(t− s)α+ sα+ 1, the original data can be reconstructed without an error.
Next, we argue how subspace signatures help restrict rank of the error introduced in the system during a node
repair process. Assume that node i fails. Let Ri ⊆ {1, . . . , n}\{i} denote the set of d surviving nodes that are
contacted to repair node i. In order to repair node i, each node j ∈ Ri is supposed to send yjVji, where Vji is an
α× β repair matrix of node i associated with node j. Since the data downloaded through all the surviving nodes
is verified against subspace signatures, data from node j passes the test if it is of the form yj V̂ji, where yj V̂ji is
in the column space of yj and V̂ji may be different form Vji.
If any of the surviving (helper) nodes does not pass the test, the trusted verifier begins the naı¨ve repair for the
failed node and the nodes that fail the test. During this naı¨ve repair, entire data is downloaded from a set of k− s
nodes out of d − s nodes that provide data for node repair and pass the subspace test. Here, s is the number
of nodes that fail the subspace test. Note that each node of these k − s selected nodes provides additional α − β
symbols as it has already sent β symbols (over Fmq ). The decoding algorithm for Gabidulin codes is run on (k−s)α
symbols downloaded from this selected set of k − s nodes. There can be at most t− s adversary nodes present in
the selected set of k − s nodes (s adversarial nodes that failed the subspace test are excluded from this process),
which can contribute at most (t− s)α erroneous symbols. Since the distance of the Gabidulin code is greater than
2(t− s)α+ sα+ 1, the decoding algorithm recovers the original file, which is used to get the data stored on nodes
being repaired.
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In case when all the adversarial nodes pass the test, the data provided by each node j ∈ Ri is of the form
yj V̂ji = yjVji + yj(V̂ji − Vji).
After performing exact repair process for node i, node i stores yi + yeBi, where Bi is an tα × α matrix over
Fq and ye = [yi1 , . . . ,yit ] ∈ Ftαqm . Here {i1, . . . , it} denotes the set of t adversarial nodes. After the node repair,
the trusted verifier generates a new subspace signature corresponding to the data stored on a node i for future
verification. At any point of time, the data stored on DSS can be represented as
y˜ = y + yeB, (12)
where columns with indices from {(i − 1)α + 1, . . . , tα} of B are equal to α columns of Bi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. It is
evident from (12) that the rank of the aggregate error in the system is at most tα and a Gabidulin code with large
enough distance can ensure the reliable recovery of the original data.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH
A novel concatenated coding scheme for DSS is presented. The scheme makes use of rank-metric codes, in
particular, Gabidulin codes, as the first step of the process of encoding the data. In the second step of the encoding
process, MDS optimal repair array codes (locally or globally) are used. This construction ensures resilience against
static adversarial errors. A modification of the scheme based on subspace signatures enables resilience against
dynamic errors. Also, upper bounds on the resilience capacity for LRCs, MSR-LRCs, and MBR-LRCs are presented.
We conclude with a list of open problems for future research.
1) Do there exist (explicit) high-rate error-correcting MSR codes which attain the upper bound (3) on the
resilience capacity for a general (dynamic) error model?
2) Is it possible to improve the bounds on resilience capacity for MSR-LRCs and MBR-LRCs?
3) Do there exist (explicit) optimal MSR-LRCs and MBR-LRCs for a general set of parameters?
REFERENCES
[1] A. G. Dimakis, P. B. Godfrey, Y. Wu, M. J. Wainwright, and K. Ramchandran, “Network coding for distributed storage systems,” IEEE
Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 56, no. 9, pp. 4539–4551, 2010.
[2] Y. Wu and A. G. Dimakis, “Reducing repair traffic for erasure coding-based storage via interference alignment,” in Proc. 2009 IEEE
International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT), 2009, pp. 2276–2280.
[3] N. B. Shah, K. V. Rashmi, P. V. Kumar, and K. Ramchandran, “Explicit codes minimizing repair bandwidth for distributed storage,”
in Proc. 2010 IEEE Information Theory Workshop (ITW), 2010, pp. 1–5.
[4] C. Suh and K. Ramchandran, “Exact-repair MDS codes for distributed storage using interference alignment,” in Proc. 2010 IEEE
International Symposium on Information Theory Proceedings (ISIT), 2010, pp. 161–165.
[5] K. V. Rashmi, N. B. Shah, and P. V. Kumar, “Optimal exact-regenerating codes for distributed storage at the MSR and MBR points
via a product-matrix construction,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 57, no. 8, pp. 5227–5239, 2011.
[6] I. Tamo, Z. Wang, and J. Bruck, “Zigzag codes: MDS array codes with optimal rebuilding,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory,
vol. 59, no. 3, pp. 1597–1616, 2013.
[7] A. G. Dimakis, K. Ramchandran, Y. Wu, and C. Suh, “A survey on network codes for distributed storage,” in Proc. of the IEEE, 2011,
pp. 476–489.
[8] A. Datta and F. Oggier, “An overview of codes tailor-made for networked distributed data storage,” CoRR, vol. abs/1109.2317, 2011.
[9] C. Huang, M. Chen, and J. Li, “Pyramid codes: Flexible schemes to trade space for access efficiency in reliable data storage systems,”
in Sixth IEEE International Symposium on Network Computing and Applications (NCA 2007), 2007, pp. 79–86.
[10] J. Han and L. Lastras-Montano, “Reliable memories with subline accesses,” in Proc. 2007 IEEE International Symposium on Information
Theory (ISIT), 2007.
[11] F. Oggier and A. Datta, “Self-repairing codes for distributed storage - a projective geometric construction,” in Proc. 2011 IEEE
Information Theory Workshop (ITW), 2011, pp. 30–34.
[12] ——, “Self-repairing homomorphic codes for distributed storage systems,” in Proc. 2011 IEEE INFOCOM,, 2011, pp. 1215–1223.
[13] C. Huang, H. Simitci, Y. Xu, A. Ogus, B. Calder, P. Gopalan, J. Li, and S. Yekhanin, “Erasure coding in windows azure storage,” in
in Proceedings of the 2012 USENIX conference on Annual Technical Conference, ser. USENIX ATC12. USENIX Association, 2012.
[Online]. Available: http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2342821.2342823
[14] D. S. Papailiopoulos and A. G. Dimakis, “Locally repairable codes,” in Proc. 2012 IEEE International Symposium on Information
Theory (ISIT), 2012, pp. 2771–2775.
[15] N. Prakash, G. M. Kamath, V. Lalitha, and P. V. Kumar, “Optimal linear codes with a local-error-correction property,” in Proc. 2012
IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT), 2012, pp. 2776–2780.
[16] A. S. Rawat and S. Vishwanath, “On locality in distributed storage systems,” in Proc. 2012 IEEE Information Theory Workshop (ITW),
2012, pp. 497–501.
16
[17] N. Silberstein, A. S. Rawat, and S. Vishwanath, “Error resilience in distributed storage via rank-metric codes,” in Proc. 2012 50th
Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing (Allerton), 2012, pp. 1150–1157.
[18] A. S. Rawat, O. O. Koyluoglu, N. Silberstein, and S. Vishwanath, “Optimal locally repairable and secure codes for distributed storage
systems,” CoRR, vol. abs/1210.6954, 2012.
[19] P. Gopalan, C. Huang, H. Simitci, and S. Yekhanin, “On the locality of codeword symbols,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory,
vol. 58, no. 11, pp. 6925–6934, 2012.
[20] G. M. Kamath, N. Prakash, V. Lalitha, and P. Kumar, “Codes with local regeneration,” CoRR, vol. abs/1211.1932, 2012.
[21] M. Sathiamoorthy, M. Asteris, D. Papailiopoulos, A. G. Dimakis, R. Vadali, S. Chen, and D. Borthakur, “Xoring elephants: novel
erasure codes for big data,” in Proceedings of the 39th international conference on Very Large Data Bases, ser. PVLDB’13. VLDB
Endowment, 2013, pp. 325–336. [Online]. Available: http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2488335.2488339
[22] H. D. L. Hollmann, “Storage codes–coding rate and repair locality,” in 2013 International Conference on Computing, Networking and
Communications (ICNC),, 2013, pp. 830–834.
[23] D. Silva, F. Kschischang, and R. Koetter, “A rank-metric approach to error control in random network coding,” IEEE Transactions on
Information Theory, vol. 54, no. 9, pp. 3951–3967, 2008.
[24] T. Etzion and N. Silberstein, “Error-correcting codes in projective space via rank-metric codes and ferrers diagrams,” IEEE Transactions
on Information Theory, vol. 55, no. 7, pp. 2909–2919, 2009.
[25] R. W. Nobrega and B. F. Uchoa-Filho, “Multishot codes for network coding using rank-metric codes,” in 2010 IEEE Wireless Network
Coding Conference (WiNC), pp. 1–6.
[26] D. Silva and F. Kschischang, “Universal secure network coding via rank-metric codes,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory,
vol. 57, no. 2, pp. 1124–1135, 2011.
[27] C. Ning, Y. Zhiyuan, M. Gadouleau, W. Ying, and B. W. Suter, “Rank metric decoder architectures for random linear network coding
with error control,” IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) Systems, vol. 20, no. 2, pp. 296–309, 2012.
[28] T. K. Dikaliotis, A. G. Dimakis, and T. Ho, “Security in distributed storage systems by communicating a logarithmic number of bits,”
in Proc. 2010 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT), 2010, pp. 1948–1952.
[29] F. Oggier and A. Datta, “Byzantine fault tolerance of regenerating codes,” in 2011 IEEE International Conference on Peer-to-Peer
Computing (P2P), 2011, pp. 112–121.
[30] S. Pawar, S. El Rouayheb, and K. Ramchandran, “Securing dynamic distributed storage systems against eavesdropping and adversarial
attacks,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 57, no. 10, pp. 6734–6753, 2011.
[31] K. V. Rashmi, N. B. Shah, K. Ramchandran, and P. V. Kumar, “Regenerating codes for errors and erasures in distributed storage,” in
Proc. 2012 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT), 2012, pp. 1202–1206.
[32] N. B. Shah, K. V. Rashmi, and P. V. Kumar, “Information-theoretically secure regenerating codes for distributed storage,” in Proc. 2011
IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference (GLOBECOM), 2011, pp. 1–5.
[33] S. Goparaju, S. El Rouayheb, R. Calderbank, and H. V. Poor, “Data secrecy in distributed storage systems under exact repair,” CoRR,
vol. abs/1304.3156v2, 2013.
[34] G. M. Kamath, N. Silberstein, N. Prakash, A. S. Rawat, V. Lalitha, O. O. Koyluoglu, P. V. Kumar, and S. Vishwanath, “Explicit MBR
all-symbol locality codes,” in Proc. 2013 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT), 2013.
[35] F. Zhao, T. Kalker, M. Medard, and K. J. Han, “Signatures for content distribution with network coding,” in Proc. 2007 IEEE
International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT), 2007.
[36] P. Delsarte, “Bilinear forms over a finite field, with applications to coding theory,” Journal of Comb. Theory, Series A, vol. 25, pp. 226
– 241, 1978.
[37] E. M. Gabidulin, “Theory of codes with maximum rank distance,” Problems of Information Transmission, vol. 21, pp. 1 – 12, July
1985.
[38] R. M. Roth, “Maximum-rank array codes and their application to crisscross error correction,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory,
vol. 37, no. 2, pp. 328–336, 1991.
[39] F. J. MacWilliams and N. J. A. Sloane, The theory of error-correcting codes. North-Holland, 1978.
[40] D. Silva and F. R. Kschischang, “Fast encoding and decoding of gabidulin codes,” in Proc. 2009 IEEE International Symposium on
Information Theory (ISIT), 2009.
[41] M. Blaum and R. M. Roth, “On lowest density MDS codes,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 45, no. 1, pp. 46–59,
1999.
[42] Y. Cassuto and J. Bruck, “Cyclic lowest density MDS array codes,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 55, no. 4, pp.
1721–1729, 2009.
